




One of the most litigated areas in recent maritime law has been
the liability of shipowners to seamen, longshoremen, and off-shore
workers' injured on board ship. This liability is commonly referred
to as the shipowner's warranty of seaworthiness. 2 The warranty
of seaworthiness developed at common law to protect seamen from
hazards present on ships.3 Because vessels at that time were sim-
ply constructed, seamen could usually ascertain hazards before
1. The term "off-shore workers" includes "harbor workers" and will be
used herein to refer to all persons, who are neither seamen nor longshore-
men, who board a ship to perform work. See, Pope & Talbot, Inc. v.
Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
2. At common law, this was a warranty with fault, not a warranty as
it is known today. Presently, the warranty of seaworthiness, like other
warranties, applies without fault in certain circumstances. See text ac-
companying notes 54-57, infra, for a discussion of the warranty of sea-
worthiness as it compares with general warranties.
3. 2 M. NoRRIs, THE LAW OF SEAmEN, § 612 at 165 (3rd ed. 1970) [here-
inafter cited as Nomus]. The original remedy granted seamen was for
"maintenance and cure", an obligation imposed upon a shipowner and the
vessel by maritime law as incident to the contract of employment. It
was not an award of compensation for disability or damages suffered, thus
it was immaterial if the shipowner caused the injury or illness. It was
simply a duty to provide care for sick or injured seamen aboard the vessel,
primarily when the injury or sickness arose during the course of a voyage.
Id., §§ 545-46 at 20-24. See also Note, 7 SAN DiEGo L. REv. 689, 692 (1970).
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boarding. Once the ship was at sea, however, seamen were helpless
against the perils ever-present on the vessel,4 therefore the courts
provided protection in the form of the seaworthiness warranty.5
With the advent of steam navigation, accompanied by its complex
machinery, seamen became increasingly less able to personally ap-
praise the vessel's staunchness, and had to depend more and more
upon the determination of the vessel's seaworthiness by others.6
The hazards increased concomitantly with the complexity of the
ships, and increased protection for seamen became necessary.7
One of the earliest cases to hold that the shipowner offered sea-
men increased protection was The Osceola.8
,. . [T]he vessel9 and her owner are, both by English and Ameri-
can law, liable to an indemnity for injuries received by seamen
in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to
supply and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to
the ship.o
Thus, the vessel and the shipowner could be liable for injuries
caused by failing to discharge a duty of reasonable care. In more
recent years, the duty to keep the ship and its appurtenances in
order has been made absolute upon shipowners.",
The current controversy in this area has arisen over the applica-
tion of this absolute duty to longshoremen. A longshoreman may
4. A most important factor underlying the duty imposed upon the ship-
owner to provide the crew with a safe working place is that seamen (un-
like landworkers who can leave their employment at will) can not walk off
the job or freely object to the circumstances surrounding the work com-
manded. Noams, supra note 3, § 612 at 167. "[T]his remedy [seaworthi-
ness] was designed to reimburse the seaman who suffered loss by reason
of hazards which he was in no position to ward off." BAER, ADMIRALTY
LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT, § 6.6 at 142 (2d ed. 1969).
5. See note 3 supra.
6. NoRRis, supra note 3, § 612 at 166.
7. Id. at 167.
8. 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
9. The vessel actually extends the warranty of seaworthiness, thus
she may be sued by a libel action, which is an in rem action against the
vessel.
10. The Osceola, 189 U.S. at 175.
11. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). The following
cases also hold that a shipowner's duty to provide a seaworthy vessel is
absolute and nondelegable: Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539
(1960); United New York and N.J. Sandy Hook Pilot's Ass'n. v. Halecki,
358 U.S. 613 (1959); Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955);
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
recover under a warranty of seaworthiness in certain circumstances,
but only when the ship is determined to be "in navigation". 12 But
whether a ship is "in navigation" or not has become a perplexing
question, left for the district courts to determine at trial.
In Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,1 3 Judge Wisdom presents a well-
articulated discussion pointed directly at the unsettled issue of
when a ship is "in navigation". The significance of the court's de-
termination is that the question of fact presented in this case is a
close one, emphasizing an area never thoroughly considered by the
Supreme Court; an area in need of further illumination.
1. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, John Watz, worked as a pipe fitter for a ship build-
ing company, engaged by defendant Zapata Off-Shore Co. to convert
its vessel, the Nola III, from a drill-tender barge to an over-the-side
barge.14 The ship had been dry-docked for roughly three months in
order to accomplish this conversion, but was, at the time of the in-
judgment to the plaintiff, finding that: (1) Zapata owed Watz a
formed, the extent of which was not clearly set forth. The plain-
tiff was injured when a twenty-foot pipe he was attempting to in-
stall on one of the ship's motors, fell on his leg. The plaintiff
brought suit against the vessel owner (Zapata), claiming the vessel
was unseaworthy. Zapata then impleaded Eaton, who was subse-
quently named a party defendant by plaintiff for negligence in as-
sembling the hoist. Eaton in turn impleaded chain manufacturer
Campbell for indemnity. The district court determined that the in-
jury resulted from a defect in the chain of the one-ton hand hoist,
as it was lowering the pipe to the plaintiff. The court awarded
jury, floating in navigable waters. Work still remained to be per-
warranty of seaworthiness, which was breached by the defective
hoist, (2) Eaton was negligent in failing to discover the defective
hoist, and (3) Campbell was negligent in the manufacture of the
chain. The court also awarded fifty per cent indemnity to Zapata
and Eaton as pleaded. The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth
Circuit, held: reversed in part. Zapata owed no warranty of sea-
worthiness where the ship was merely in navigable waters, and not
"in navigation" sufficient to sustain the claim. The issue of negli-
12. Roper v. United States, 368 U.S. 20 (1961); West v. United States, 361
U.S. 118 (1959); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
13. 431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Watz].
14. The vessel, a drill-tender barge, was purchased by Zapata in July of
1959 for $202,500 for conversion into a floating drilling barge. The original
estimate of this conversion was $159,060, but extra work and materials in-
creased the conversion cost to $500,000. Id. at 107.
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gence against Eaton was upheld by the court, sustaining the district
court's finding that Eaton failed to use sufficient care in testing the
hoist and chain. Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100 (5th
Cir. 1970).
The court of appeals determined that the vessel was too attenu-
ated from maritime operations to warrant its seaworthiness to the
plaintiff in this case, and that its mere presence in "navigable wa-
ters" was sufficient only to sustain the claim of negligence. This
article will seek to examine when longshoremen and offshore work-
ers will be afforded protection under the warranty of seaworthi-
ness,15 including a consideration of the difficult question of when a
ship is "in navigation".
IH. SEAWORTHINESS
A. Extension
The concept of seaworthiness in personal injury matters provides
that a ship's hull, gear, appliances, appurtenances, and crew will be
reasonably fit for its intended purpose.16 "The standard is not per-
fection, but reasonable fitness; not a ship that will weather every
conceivable storm or withstand every imaginable peril of the sea,
but a vessel reasonably suitable for her intended service."17  Ini-
tially, the warranty of seaworthiness was owed to seamen alone.'
This protection was later extended however to include a longshore-
man who performed a seaman's work and incurred a seaman's haz-
15. The scope of this note will be limited to a discussion of the ship-
owner's liability for unseaworthiness to longshoremen and off-shore work-
ers on his ship, performing a seaman's task. No consideration will be
given herein to a longshoreman's rights under the Longshoreman's and
Harbor Workers Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 903(a), 905 (1964), (a longshoreman's
rights against his employer) nor a longshoreman's right as a "seaman" un-
der the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964), (granting "seaman" recovery for a
shipowner's negligence). A good discussion of both areas may be found in
BAER, ADuImuLTY LAW OF THE SuPRurE CouRT, chs. 6-7 (2d ed. 1969).
16. Nomus, supra note 3, § 613 at 169. See also The Southwark, 191
U.S. 1 (1903); and International Navigation Co. v. Farr & Bailey Mfg. Co.,
181 U.S. 218 (1901).
17. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960).
18. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
Obviously the norm of the liability has been historically and still
is the case of the seaman under contract with the vessel's owner.
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. at 90.
ards. The leading case is Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki.19 Long-
shoreman Sieracki was injured on board defendant's ship. In
granting recovery (based on unseaworthiness), the court consid-
ered Sieracki's employment by an independant contractor unim-
portant. The loading of the vessel was work traditionally per-
formed by seamen; the shipowner should not be relieved of liability
for unseaworthiness merely because a longshoreman was perform-
ing the work rather than a seaman.
2 0
Sieracki's impact was felt immediately. The Supreme Court held
that off-shore workers injured aboard a ship could also recover un-
der the warranty of seaworthiness, as long as they were incurring
hazards similar to those of seamen.2 1 Later cases determined that
where the shipowner had no control over the area of the injury, he
could still be liable for an unseaworthy vessel.22 Also, a ship was
found to be unseaworthy where the defective equipment was
brought on ship by the stevedoring company employed by the ship-
owner.23 Even where the longshoreman was located on the pier, he
could recover from the shipowner for the unseaworthiness of a ves-
sel, if he was engaged in work traditionally performed by seamen.24
19. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
20. Id. at 95-96 where the Court said:
On principle we agree with the Court of Appeals that this
policy [absolute duty of seaworthiness] is not confined to seamen
who perform the ship's service under immediate hire to the owner,
but extends to those who render it with his consent or by his ar-
rangement. All the considerations which gave birth to the lia-
bility and have shaped its absolute character dictate that the owner
should not be free to nullify it by parcelling out his operations to
intermediary employers whose sole business is to take over por-
tions of the ship's work or by other devices which would strip the
men performing its service of their historic protection .... That
the owner seeks to have it done with the advantages of more mod-
ern divisions of labor does not minimize the worker's hazard and
should not nullify his protection.
21. Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
22. Albanese v. N.V. Nederl. Amerik. Stoomv. Maats., 392 F.2d 763 (2d
Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, sub nom., International Terminal Op-
erating Co. v. N.V. Nederl. Amerik. Stoomv. Maats., 393 U.S. 74 (1968),
modified, 393 U.S. 995 (1968). The court of appeals determined that the
shipowner's lack of control over the area where the injury occurred did not
reduce the shipowner's duty to keep the ship reasonably safe. 392 F.2d
at 764.
23. Petterson v. Alaska Steamship Co., 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 396 (1954).
The shipowner is normally entitled to indemnity where the injury is
caused by the negligence of the stevedoring company. See Italia Soc. v.
Oregon Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1964).
24. Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963). Plaintiff
slipped on beans which escaped on the pier while he was loading vessel;
the court held that the shipowner was liable for unseaworthiness, since
the plaintiff was engaged in work traditionally performed by seamen. See
also Spann v. Lauritzen, 344 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1965).
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Thus, the label given the employee was of little consequence in
determining whether the shipowner was liable for an unseaworthy




The warranty of seaworthiness extends only to those vessels that
are "in navigation". 26 A ship is "in navigation" when it is able to
self-propel and self-direct itself,27 a determination of fact.28 Thus, a
ship that is floating in navigable waters may not be in navigation
if it is unable to propel itself.29 This limitation on seaworthiness
was strongly advocated in West v. United States.30 West was an
employee of a contractor engaged by the government to revive a
ship from the "mothball fleet" for maritime service. The injury oc-
curred while the ship was undergoing extensive repairs and over-
There is a split whether defective equipment located on the pier, causing
injury to a longshoreman, can be the subject of an unseaworthiness claim.
The more modern view is to allow recovery against the shipowner for an
unseaworthy vessel, where the land-based loading equipment is defective.
Huff v. Matson Navigation Ins. Co., 338 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1964). Contra,
McKnight v. N.M. Paterson & Sons Ltd., 286 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1960). It is
assumed in Watz that the hoist was aboard the ship at the time of the in-
jury.
25. Partridge v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
26. Roper v. United States, 368 U.S. 20, 23 (1961); United New York and
N.J. Sandy Hook Pilots Ass'n. v. Halecki, 358 U.S. 613 (1959); White v. U.S.,
400 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1968); Van Horn v. Gulf Atlantic Towing Corp., 388
F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1968).
It is now authoritatively settled, if indeed it was ever in doubt,
that, when a ship has been withdrawn from navigation and while
she is being reconditioned, she does not warrant her seaworthi-
ness to those who work aboard her until she returns to active
service.
Latus v. U.S., 277 F.2d 264, 266 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 827
(1960). (emphasis added).
27. Roper v. United States, 368 U.S. at 23. When the ship is operating
at sea, then status is not an issue. A ship's navigable ability does become
relevant, however, when it is docked, or being towed about by another
vessel.
28. Butler v. Whiteman, 356 U.S. 271 (1958).
29. See Moye v. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, 402 F.2d 238
(5th Cir. 1968); cf., Lawlor v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 275 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 844 (1960). In Lawlor, the vessel was moored
in navigable waters undergoing an annual overhaul; the court held that
seaworthiness extended to the longshoreman injured.
30. 361 U.S. 118 (1959). [hereinafter cited as West].
hauling for reactivation. The Supreme Court refused to allow the
claim for unseaworthiness, advancing a broad standard to be ap-
plied.
It would appear that the focus should be upon the status of the
ship, the pattern of the repairs, and the extensive nature of the
work contracted to be done, rather than the specific type of work
that each of the numerous shore-based workmen is doing on ship-
board at the moment of injury.31
In effect then, this broad standard relieved the shipowner from lia-
bility for unseaworthiness if the vessel was not in navigation. In
determining this, the court said it would view the character of the
work performed rather than the specific job. The court seemingly
departed from its willingness to extend seaworthiness protection
originating under Sieracki. But, the character of the work in West
involved major overhauling and repairs to the vessel, which are
normally not performed by seamen. Also, the vessel in West had
been out of navigation for a long while, and was at the time in the
process of being built for sea. Thus, the impact of West was mini-
mal at most. Under the facts, it was imperative for the court to
view the entire project rather than the specific job. If the vessel is
not in maritime service, those workers aboard it can not be sea-
men; thus, the entire project is relevent to the question of whether
the vessel is in "maritime service" or not. Most cases granting
longshoremen recovery for unseaworthiness have involved projects
which seamen traditionally perform, 2 but West involved a project
totally withdrawn from seamen's duties. Also, under the Sieracki
standard, West would not have been able to qualify since he was
engaged in work that seamen did not traditionally perform.3 Con-
sequently, the impact of West on future cases was not great, and
the lower courts have been able to distinguish it.
4
The Supreme Court strengthened its stand in West two years later
in Roper v. United States.3" The plaintiff in Roper was injured
31. 361 U.S. at 122.
32. In most cases extending seaworthiness to longshoremen and off-
shore workers, the particular project is loading or unloading a vessel or the
project involves minor repairs which seamen have traditionally performed.
See Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Seas Shipping Co.
v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); Lawlor v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 275 F.2d
599 (2d Cir. 1960).
33. The petitioner was injured by a defectively secured plug on a water
pipe in the vessel's engine room. The court found the vessel to be out of
maritime service at the time, thus ". . . there could be no express or im-
plied warranty of seaworthiness to any person." 361 U.S. at 122 (emphasis
added).
34. E.g., Lawlor v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 275 F.2d at 599. "[H] ere we
have ... nothing in the category of major repairs or structural and ex-
tensive changes in the vessel . . ." Id. at 604.
35. 368 U.S. 20 (1961). [Hereinafter cited as Roper].
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while unloading a deactivated vessel. The vessel had been used to
store goods but had never been used to tow these goods. The vessel
was pushed into dock with the assistance of other seagoing vessels.
The Supreme Court, relying heavily on West, determined that the
status of the vessel was crucial; because the ship was not in active
maritime service, no warranty of seaworthiness attached to it.3s
The similarity with West is factually evident, but Roper offers a
more substantial impact. The injured plaintiff in Roper was en-
gaged in work which seamen traditionally perform, thus, he would
fall directly under the Sieracki standard.37 The court refused to
apply that standard in this case, impliedly asserting, as it had in
West, that wide-spread recovery by longshoremen was to be cur-
tailed in the future.
Standing alone, the West decision probably did not substantially
limit the Sieracki doctrine. However, the effect of Roper, decided
in reliance upon West, is to diminish appreciably the applicability
of the unseaworthiness doctrine to longshoremen and harbor work-
ers by reducing the number of workers covered by the warranty.
38
The significance of this statement is amplified by the fact that when
a vessel is out of commission, the workmen on board are likely to be
off-shore workers rather than seamen.3 9 Roper tends to make abso-
lute the requirement that the ship be capable of maritime service
("in navigation") before the owner will guarantee the ship's sea-
worthiness.
Roper, similar to West, involves an extreme case. The ship was
36. Id. at 23-24.
37. Comment, A New Look at the Unseaworthiness Doctrine: The Roper
Case, 29 U. CHm. L. REV. 519, 529 (1962). The above comment offers a good
discussion of the effect of Roper and West on the shipowner's warranty of
seaworthiness to longshoremen.
38. Id.
39. This is a point of departure in Lawlor v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
275 F.2d at 599.
The ship's crew was present on the vessel throughout the overhauling
period, which was not the case in West.
The court in Watz distinguished Lawlor, because it placed too much reli-
ance upon the crew's presence. That fact did not seem to be the ratio
decendi of the Lawlor decision, but merely a factor considered in deter-
mining whether the ship was unseaworthy or not. Certainly the presence
of Zapata's vice-president throughout the conversion period is equal to the
presence of the ship's crew in Lawlor, so that distinction does not seem
to be essential to the case. See note 51, infra.
completely out of maritime service at the time, having no seagoing
credentials.40 The need to view the entire project undertaken was
again present, as it was in West, to ascertain whether the vessel was
in maritime service or not.
The total effect of West and Roper has been unable to curtail the
extension of Sieracki's "humanitarian policy" to longshoremen.
41
Several circuits have completely ignored applying the West-Roper
standard in close cases.42 One circuit, in a post-West decision, used
the broadened principle to determine the vessel's status, but, even
so, applied the warranty of seaworthiness to a ship which had been
withdrawn from maritime service for its annual overhaul.4
3
Expansion of protection to longshoremen under seaworthiness
has also taken place freely in the Supreme Court.44 Thus, the focal
point of the change brought about by West and Roper is not to
eliminate recovery under Sieracki, but to limit actions by long-
shoremen for seaworthiness to cases where the ship is in navigation.
Where the ship is not in navigation, being subject to such major
work that control is in effect surrendered, then recovery for an un-
seaworthy vessel will be denied.45 In cases where the ship remains
40. 368 U.S. at 21.
41. The Supreme Court, in Sieracki, described seaworthiness as, ".
a form of absolute duty owing to all within range of its humanitarian
policy." 328 U.S. at 95.
42. Gebhard v. S.S. Hawaiian Legislator, 425 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1970):
Extension of the seaworthiness warranty to injuries occurring on land to a
marine clerk; Williams v. Ocean Transport Lines, Inc., 425 F.2d 1183 (3d
Cir. 1970): Longshoreman employed by an independent contractor, was in-
jured while discharging cargo. The injury was sustained from a defect in a
shore-based crane. The court upheld the claim for seaworthiness, citing
Sieracki; Venable v. A/S Det Forenede Dampskibsselskab, 399 F.2d 347
(4th Cir. 1968): Extension of seaworthiness protection to longshoremen,
citing Sieracki; McDonald v. U.S., 321 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1963): Sieracki's
principles again invoked to extend seaworthiness to longshoreman per-
forming work of a seaman. McDonald applies both Sieracki and West-
Roper principles.
43. Lawlor v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 275 F.2d at 599. The court ex-
pressed displeasure with the phrase "out of navigation", especially in close
cases. Id. at 602-03.
44. Albanese v. N.V. Nederl. Amerik. Stoomv. Maats., 392 F.2d at 763:
Control is not dispositive of a shipowner's duty of seaworthiness; Wald-
ron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 386 U.S. 724 (1967): Longshoreman could
claim unseaworthiness when he was injured by failure of officers to assign
adequate number of personnel to perform work safely; Italia Soc. v. Oregon
Stevedoring Co., 376 U.S. 315 (1964): Shipowner may be indemnified by
stevedoring co., whose equipment caused unseaworthy condition-no need to
show fault; Gutierrez v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963):
Longshoreman injured on pier could recover for unseaworthy vessel; and
Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
45. See Van Horn v. Gulf Atlantic Towing Corp., 388 F.2d 636 (4th
Cir. 1968).
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in navigation, Sieracki remains a viable test.
C. Further Limitations
The Fifth Circuit has been much more restrictive in granting
longshoremen recovery under seaworthiness. In Moye v. Sioux
City & New Orleans Barge Lines, 46 the court struck down a claim
arising under seaworthiness, citing West, where the vessel had been
surrendered to a contractor to make some structural repairs. The
repairs took 19 hours. The court applied the West standard, holding
that because the ship was not located in navigable waters, it was at
the time out of navigation, thus could not be subject to a claim for
unseaworthiness. The court did not determine when the open hatch
covers, which caused the injury, became defective (whether before
or after delivery for repairs).47 This point may be significant, for
if the shipowner had been in control of the vessel at the time the de-
fect originated, and it originated while the ship was "in navigation",
then he would be subject to a claim for unseaworthiness. 48 The
court proceeded upon the theory that once the ship was dry-docked,
it immediately came out of navigation, and thus was not subject to
a claim for unseaworthiness. 49 No notice was taken of the small
amount of time involved for the repairs, nor the rather routine re-
pairs being undertaken. 50
46. 402 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1968).
47. Id. at 239.
48. Mollica v. Compania Sud-Americana, 202 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1953):
the shipowner was held liable for an unseaworthy vessel where he had
control of the affected area long enough to ascertain and correct the defect.
49. The court admits that there were no major repairs or structural
changes involved, just a "renewal of side plating in two places, the re-
newal of some deck plating and the reworking of Nos. 4 and 5 roller hatch
covers." The work required dry-docking in a floating dry dock, and con-
trol was surrendered. Under these circumstances, recovery was denied.
The ship was not out of marine service as in West and Roper; it had only
been surrendered for minor repairs, lasting less than a day; cf., Lawlor v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 275 F.2d at 602-03:
Surely a vessel that has hit one of the submerged logs or other
floating obstructions that plague our large harbors and has dam-
aged her propellers so that she has to be towed to a shipyard
for a day or two for repairs before continuing her voyage can not
fairly be said to have so changed her status as to eliminate any
duty to the officers and crew on board to maintain the vessel and
her equipment in a seaworthy condition until repairs have been
completed.
50. Renewing side plating and deck plating, as well as reworking hatch
covers might have been jobs which were traditionally performed by sea-
The Fifth Circuit, contrary to the trend of the Supreme Court,"1
shows a rather strict construction of West and Roper in order to
find the vessel in Moye out of navigation. The court extended the
concept of West to include a ship only temporarily withdrawn from
navigation, clearly not part of the West decision. The fact that the
longshoreman may have been able to recover under Sieracki, serves
to illustrate the court's reluctance in Moye to offer seaworthiness
protection to longshoremen in these factually close cases.
In Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., the Fifth Circuit continued its
strict interpretation of West and Roper. The Nola was in navigable
waters at the time of the plaintiff's injury. Though extensive struc-
tural changes had been made, the court gives no indication that the
ship was still undergoing this major work. 2 If major structural
changes remained to be made, they certainly were not as extensive
as those in West and Roper. At the time of the injury, a represen-
tative of Zapata was aboard the vessel.53 The court, concerning
itself solely with West, found that just being in navigable waters
was not sufficient to permit a claim for unseaworthiness, but held
that the ship must be in "maritime service". rt was determined that
the Nola was not as yet able to enter maritime service, thus recovery
was denied. Whether or not the plaintiff would have qualified un-
der Sieracki is questionable; the court never reached that issue.
The important point is that the court again rejected a longshore-
man's claim under a questionable fact pattern. This result was not
the intent of West, and certainly not the trend in recent cases.
The strict construction which the Fifth Circuit has applied to sea-
worthiness claims is not only -inconsistent with the current trend
under seaworthiness, but is also inconsistent with the current trend
men, with similar "risks" involved. Thus, under the Sieracki standard,
the plaintiff should be within the limits of recovery.
51. "The obvious trend of the Supreme Court decisions is toward pro-
viding ever increasing protection for crewmen, longshoremen and even
others employed by independent contractors who may be called upon to
work aboard vessels." Scott v. Isbrandtsen Co., 327 F.2d 113, 124 (4th
Cir. 1964).
52. The accident occurred about 3 months after the project began. There
"was considerable work to be done", with no indication of its nature.
Brief for Appellant at 6. The Appellee's Brief indicates that the work be-
ing done was "piping and electrical", and part of the duty of the vessel's
crew. Brief for Appellee at 5. The court says, "... . a considerable amount
of work remained to be performed, and the vessel was not yet able to
operate as an over-the-side drilling barge." 431 F.2d at 107 (emphasis
added).
53. The court dismissed the presence of the representative as insuffi-
cient indicia of shipowner control. The only evidence presented was that
he was present to ascertain that the job was being performed the way
Zapata wanted it, but that he did not direct any of the workmen. Id. at 108,
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of recovery under warranties in general. A warranty normally is
a guarantee that the goods will meet some commercially reasonable
standard, whether express or implied. The scope of the claim un-
der a breach of warranty includes all persons who can be foreseen
as users,64 and has now been embraced by the law of strict liability
in tort, extending from the manufacturer,55 and retailers,56 to all
persons who can foreseeably be injured.57 The warranty of sea-
worthiness is a warranty along similar lines. It is a guarantee by
the shipowner that the ship will be reasonably fit for its intended
use. The shipowner becomes analogous to a manufacturer who
guarantees that his product will not only work, but work safely and
reasonably well.
The standard in Sieracki seeks to carry out a policy of protection
for all who can foreseeably be injured while working on a ship.
The purpose of West is to limit this protection where ships are out
of maritime service. Therefore, the latter must be limited to only
the most flagrant cases, in order to assure protection for longshore-
men. The Fifth Circuit seems to have taken the standard in West
and Roper and applied it in all cases where the ship is out of mari-
time service, clearly not in line with the current trend in warranty
protection.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is some doubt whether West and Roper can adequately
serve as limitations on Sieracki where the ship is not totally out of
maritime service. A problem arises in applying the seaworthiness
54. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960):
Manufacturer of auto held liable to all persons within scope of use, and
not just the immediate purchaser.
55. Id.
56. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1964); Goldberg v. Kolisman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432,
191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
57. Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 652 (1969): recovery was allowed for a bystander struck by an auto-
mobile. See also Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57,
377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962), a landmark decision for strict lia-
bility in tort for a breach of warranty, in which the court pointed out:
The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers
that put such products on the market rather than by the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves.
59 Cal. 2d at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
warranty to longshoremen: How to distinguish those duties on a
navigable ship from those on a non-navigable ship? A seaman
traditionally was required to stay with his ship and perform those
menial tasks aboard the vessel which were within his capabilities.
No distinction was made regarding the status of the ship, for it made
little difference. A seaman was a seaman, regardless where the
ship was located. He was a member of the crew, paid by the vessel
owner, and thus entitled to protection. After Sieracki, the question
of the ship's status was never an issue, because, again, it tradition-
ally was never significant. After the West and Roper decisions, it
became obvious that the vessel's status was important, at least as it
applied to longshoremen receovering under a claim for unsea-
worthiness. But, as both West and Roper have indicated, when
there is no ship at all (for all intents and purposes), the longshore-
man could scarcely be said to rely upon a ship's seaworthiness. A
ship that is undergoing major work in order to be put to sea is un-
likely to employ any crew at all; the work being done on the vessel
approaches work of a building contractor rather than a seaman.
The same rationale exists when a deactivated ship is used to store
goods. But, where the ship has had a crew on board, currently
absent to allow repairs on the ship, the distinction in West and
Roper is far from clear. Where a seaman might have performed
these services parcelled out, the distinction is even less clear, since
denial of relief to an off-shore worker performing traditional sea-
man's tasks would not serve the principles of Sieracki, nor the
"humanitarian policy" it sought to promote.
The argument articulated then is: when the ship is out of navi-
gation, there will be no recovery. This position begs the question
without a more well-defined standard upon which to base the judg-
ment of "in or out of navigation". Both West and Roper said it was
a question of fact, but without a standard upon which to make a
comparison, that judgment goes astray. Neither West nor Roper
present the type of standard needed, since the fact situations in
both cases leave no question as to the navigability of the vessels in-
volved.
In Watz, the issue presented is close enough to meet the problem
head on. There was no indication by the court of precisely how
much work remained on the vessel. The vessel had undergone
structural changes, but it seems unlikely that the vessel would have
been set afloat had those structural changes remained. Again, it is
not clear whether the project undertaken by the shipbuilding com-
pany could have been one that a seaman traditionally performed.
Comment
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Finally, the court failed to satisfactorily distinguish Lawlor,58 which
is factually similar to the present case, but arrives at a different re-
sult. Hence, the case presented a close issue of fact concerning the
ship's navigability, providing the court an opportunity to point out
exactly when a ship would be found to be "in navigation". The
vessel here is in navigable waters, but apparently not in "maritime
service"-"in navigation". At what point the vessel would pass
into navigation is not clear from the case, and certainly not clear
from any previous authoritative standard. The court determined
that the vessel was out of navigation as a matter of law.59 The
court chose to rely on West as authority for its determination that
the ship was not "in navigation". This reliance on West conveni-
ently allowed the court to avoid giving any definite determination
to the problem, since the facts in West are so blatently one-sided.
Clearly, this area is in great need of further clarification, hopefully
in a case, like Watz, which presents a close issue of fact, paving the
way for the development of a workable standard.
JoHN M. GANT Us
58. See text accompanying notes 29 & 39, supra.
59. The district court determined that the vessel was "in navigation"
as a "conclusion of law". The court of appeals here disagreed with the
district court's finding, determining it to be "clearly erroneous", thus re-
versing that part of the decision.
